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[8. F. No. 19672. In Bank. May 23, 1958.]

Estate of HERBERT EDW ARD LAW, Deceased. WELLS
FARGO BANK (a Corporation), as Executor, etc., Appellant, v. ROBERT C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, etc., Respondent.
[1] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Federal Estate Tax.-A provision in a will that inheritance and estate taxes should be
paid "out of my residuary estate in the same manner as an expense of administration" and should not be apportioned, prorated or charged against any of the devisees, legatees or beneficiaries precluded proration of the federal estate tax under
Prob. Code, §§ 970-977.
[2] ld. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions. - The
Legislature has the power to determine whether the wife's
share of testator's separate property that is exempt from inheritance tax should be computed by subtracting all allowable
deductions, ineluding the federal estate tax, from the market
value of the entire estate and taking half the remainder as the
marital exemption, or by subtracting only deductions other
tban the federal estate tax from the market value of the entire estate before taking half as the marital exemption.
[3] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-Under
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, declaring that "Property equal in
amount to the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's
separate property shall, if transferred to the spouse of the
deeeased, be exempt from the [inheritanee] tax imposed," the
marital exemption is limited to the lesser of two amounts,
the amount "transferred to the spouse" and the amount of the
"e1ear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate
property."
[4] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-Under
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, defining the wife's share of testator's separate property tbat is exempt from inheritance tsx
as property equal in amount-to the clear market value of one
half of deeedent's separate property, the words "elear market
value" are governed by tbe definitions in §§ 13311 (" 'Market
value,' in respect to property included in any transfer, means
tbe market value of tbe property as of the date of the transferor's death, wbether or not tbe transfer was made during tbe
life time of the transferor"), 13312 (" 'Clear market value'

[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, §§ 41, 55 et seq.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 414; [2-11,13,14] Taxation, § 441(3); [12,15] Taxation, § 441(4).
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means the market value of any property in any transfer, less
any deductions allowable"}; if the Legislature had intended
that JlO df'ductions should have been subtraoted, it would
simply have used the words "market value" instead of "clear
market value."
[6] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 13805, defining the wife's share of testator's separate property that is exempt from inheritance tax as property
equal in amount to the clear market value of one half of decedent's separate property, cannot reasonably be construed
as meaning that deductions are allowable only to particular
distributees, that the allowable deductions to be subtracted in
arrh ing at the marital exemption must be the wife's allowable
deductions, and that none of the federal estate tax should be
subtracted fr<>m half the market value of decedent's separate
property in arriving" at the marital exemption, since it is immaterial whether the allowable deductions are taken from the
total market value of decedent's separate property or from
half the market value so long as half the total deductions (the
pro rata share thereof) are subtracted from each half of the
market value of decedent's separate property to arrive at the
clear market value of each half; since the clear market value
of either half of decedent's separate property cannot be greater
or less than the clear market value of the other half, the allowable deductions must be prorated equally to each half.
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-DeductioDS.-Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 13805, cannot reasonably be construed as providing that the allowable deductions to be subtracted in arriving
at the marital exemption from inheritance tax must be the
surviving spouse's allowable deductions, since the words "equal
in amount" clearly show that the relationship between the
"Property" that "shall • • • be exempt" and "the clear market
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property" is
purely quantitative and that it is immaterial whether· the
property exempted is community or separate property or
whether the separate property or any part thereof does or
does not pass to the surviving spouse.
[7] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Since in
determining the marital exemption from inheritance tax it is
immaterial whether or not the surviving spouse receives
separate property, it is likewise immaterial what deductions
may be allowed with respect to property the surviving spouse
actually receives; there is no more reason for assuming that
the deductions to be taken in determining the clear market
value of one-half of decedent's separate property are the deductions allowable to the surviving spouse than that they are
the deductions allowable to other distributees.
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[8] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions. - The
words "clear market value," as used in Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13805, do not have a meaning restricted to specific distributees, since the quoted words mean "the market value of any
property included in any transfer, less any deductions allowable" (§ 13312), "transfer" is defined in § 13304 as including
"the passage of any property, or any interest therein or income
therefrom, in possession or enjoyment, present or future, in
trust or otherwise," and the sections that provide for deductions (§§ 13981-13990) state that the particular expenses "are
deductible from the appraised value of property included in
any transfer ••• made by the decedent."
[9] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-V aluation-Deductions.-Under 18
Cal. Admin. Code, §§ 837, 848, 849, which provide that the
inheritance tax is "ordinarily" measured by the clear market
value of the distributive share of a decedent's estate to which
a particular transferee is entitled and provide for such computation, the clear market value of the entire estate would be
determined and the tax computed with respect to each distributee's share of the net estate where the testator directed
that all expenses, including federal estate tax, were to be paid
from the estate and not prorated or charged to any of the
beneficiaries; no deduction would be allowed to each distributee since the deductions would be allowed in determining the
net estate (clear market value of the estate).
[10] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation-DeductioDS.-Wben a
testator-direm-that an expense is not to be charged to the
individual beneficiaries but is to be charged against a part of
the estate, the deduction for that expense should be allowed
against that part and the tax on the beneficiaries of that part
should be computed on their net share thereof.
[11] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-Deductions. - The
Legislature's use of "clear market value" in Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13805, plainly demonstrates that the phrase has meaning
with respect to a certain part of the estate since it requires
that the clear market value-be taken of one"half of decedent's
separate property, whic!}. need not pass to a single distributee,
i.e., the wife, but may actually pass to various distributees.
[12] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation-Deductions.-Since
the state statute provides for deduction of the federal estate
tax in determining "clear market value," it must enter into the
computation of the state marital exemption from inheritance
tax, for that exemption is governed by the controlling words
"clear market value" whose meaning is made to depend on
allowable deductions.
[13] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation - Deductions.-The
state provisions relative to inheritance tax on the surviving
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spouse's share of decedent's separate property were not in- .
tended to have the same consequences as the federal provisions,
since the state provides for a marital exemption rather than a
deduction.
[14] ld. - Inheritance 'l'axation-Valuation-Deductions.-In enacting Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805, the Legislature did not
intend full equality in the tax treatment of separate property and post-1927 community property, since § 13805 provides for an exemption rather than an exclusion and § 13312
compels the consideration of federal estate tax as an allowable
deduction.
[16] ld.-Inheritance 'l'axation-Valuation-Deductions.-Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 13805, is concerned with the computation of the
marital exemption for state inheritance tax, not with which
shares shall be charged with payment of the federal estate tax,
and when the proration provisions apply only those beneficiaries whose shares contributed to the creation of the federal
estate tax will be charged with its payment j the proration
provisions do not establish a policy that there shall be no state
inheritance tax on any property qualifying for the federal
marital deduction.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco overruling objections and fixing
an inheritance tax. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Harold I. Boucher, W. J.
McFarland, Claude H. Hogan, Jr., Willis D. Hannawalt and
Arthur L. Content for Appellant.
Robert C. Harris, Donald B. Falconer, Heller, Ehrman,
White & McAuliffe, Jannin & Morgan and Boos, Jennings Ii;
Haid as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Joseph
D. Lear and Charles J. Barry, Assistant Chief Inheritance
Tax Attorneys, and Milton D. Harris, Assistant Inheritance
Tax Attorney. for Respondent.

I

TRAYNOR, J.-The executor of the estate of Herbert E.
Law appeals from the orders of the trial court overruling its
objections and :fixing the marital exemption under section
13805 of the Revenue and Taxation Code at the amount computed by the Controller.
Decedent died testate on June 18, 1952. He left over half
his estate to his wife, provided a legacy for an adopted daugh- •
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ter, and left the residue in trust for other beneficiaries.
[1] The will provided that inheritance and estate taxes
should be paid •• out of my residuary estate in the same manner as an expense of administration" and should not be apportioned, prorated, or charged against any of the devisees,
legatees, or beneficiaries. This provision precluded proration
of the federal estate tax under sections 970 to 977 of the
Probate Code. The market value of decedent's estate, which
consisted solely of separate property, was $2,961,436.71.
[2] The computations of the marital exemption contended
for by the parties are as follows:
Controller's Computation
Executor's Computation
Market value of
Market value of
decedent's
decedent's
estate ...... $2,961,436.71
estate ...... $2,961,436.71
Less all allowLess all allow. able deducable deductions except
tions, including federal
federal estate
estate tax ...
491,005.67
tax .••.....
72,104.54
Take half of .. 2,470,431.04 Take half of .. 2,889,332.17
Marital exempMarital exemption ........ . 1,235,215.52
tion ........ 1,444,666.08
The difference in the computations arises· from the fact
that the Controller subtracts all allowable deductions, including the federal estate tax ($418,901.13). from the market
value of the entire estate and takes half the remainder as the
marital exemption, whereas the executor subtracts only deductions other than the federal estate tax from the market
value of the entire estate before taking half as the· marital
exemption. The executor's computation increases the marital
exemption as computed by the Controller by half the federal
estate tax. The Legislature has the power to prescribe either
computation. (Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S, 137, 144-145 [45
S.Ct.424, 69 L.Ed. 884, 44 A.L.R. 1454] ; Estate of Watkinson, 191 Cal. 591, 596 [217 P. 1073].) The question is: What
computation has it prescribed'
[3] The answer depends upon the proper construction to
be given section 13805 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.
The pertinent part of that section provides:
"Property equal in amount to the clear market value of onehalf of the decedent's separate property shall, if transferred
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to the spouse of the deceased, be exempt from the tax imposed

by t1us part.... "
The marital exemption under this section, like the federal
marital deduction (26 U.B.C.A., § 2056), is limited to the
lesser of two amounts, the amount "transferred to the spouse"
and the amount of the "clear market value of one-half of the
decedent's separate property." The issue here concerns the
second limitation, for the amount thereof under either the
executor's or the controller's computation is less than the
amount transferred to the spouse.
[4] The controlling words in this limitation, "clear market
value, " are governed by the definitions in sections 13311 and
13312, for section 13302 provides: "Except where the context
otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter govern the construction of this part." "This part" consists of
part 8 entitled "Inheritance Tax" and includes sections 13301
through 14901. Section 13311 provides: " 'Market value,' in
respect to property included in any transfer, means the market
value of the property as of the date of the transferor's death,
whether or not the transfer was made during the life time
of the transferor." Section 13312 provides: " , Clear market
value' means the market value of any property included in
any transfer, less any deductions allowable by this part." It
is obvious at the outset that had the Legislature intended that
no deductions should be subtracted, it would simply have used
the words "market value" instead of "clear market value."
It remains therefore to determine what the allowable deductions are and from what they should be deducted.
The allowable deductions are set forth in sections 13981 to
13990 and include such items as expenses of administration,
debts, expenses of funeral and last illness, attorney's fees, and
federal, estate lax (§ 13989). Since the federal estate tax
is an allowable deduction, the Controller contends that in
conformity with section 13312 it must be .subtracted from the
market value of decedent's separate property to ascertain the
clear market value thereof and that half the amount so ascertained is "the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's
separate property."1
'If both community property and leparate property were included in
the estate, only a pro rata share of allowable deductions would be sub·
tracted by the Controller from the separate property to obtain the "clear
market value" thereof. Since the entire estate herein consists of separate
property, no prorating of allowable deductions between leparate and
community property iI called for.
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The executor contends that the Controller's computation involves an unauthorized transposition of the words of the
statute from •• the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate property" to "one-half of the clear market
value of the decedent's separate property.'" Theexecutor's
theory apparently is that the section as worded requires
taking half the market value of decedent's separate property
before subtracting the allowable deductions therefrom to
arrive at the clear market value thereof under section 13312.
The executor then contends, citing 18 Administrative Code,
sections 837, 848, and 849, that clear market value has meaning
only with respect to particular distributees and that deductions are allowable, not to the estate of a decedent, but only
to particular distributees; that since the only beneficiary concerned with the marital exemption is the wife, the allowable
deductions to be subtracted in arriving at the marital exemption must be the wife's allowable deductions; and that since
the wife in this case is not charged with payment of any
federal estate tax because the decedent directed that it should
be paid out of the residue and none of the residue went to the
wife, she is not allowed any deduction therefor (§ 13981) and
accordingly none of the federal estate tax should be subtracted
from half the market value of decedent's ·separate property
in arriving at the marital exemption.
[6] Section 13805 cannot reasonably be construed to support the executor's contention. In the first place it is immaterial whether the allowable deductions are taken from the
total market value of decedent's separate property or from
half the market value thereof 80 long as half the total deduc~
tions (the pro rata share thereof) are subtracted from each
half of the market value of decedent's separate property to
arrive at the clear market value of each half. To arrive at
the clear market valu~ of each half there is no more reason
to subtract all the deductions from anyone half than there is
to subtract all of them from -the other half. The two halves
of any figure are necessarily equal. Therefore, since the clear
-Aa atated in the brief of amici curiae, the executor'a ease lltanda or
falla on the proposition that •• the clear market value of one-half of the
decedent'. eparate property" means IOmething different from ., onehalf of the clear market value of the decedent'. separate property." The
Controller contends that the result would be the same in either ease;
that "the clear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate
property" means the eame thing as "one-half of the clear market nlue
of the decedent'a aeparate propert,.."
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market value of either half of the decedent's separate property
cannot be greater or less than the clear market value of the
other half, the allowable deductions must be prorated equally
to eaah half.
[6] In the second place, section 13805 cannot reasonably i
be construed as providing that the allowable deductions to be
subtracted in arriving at the marital exemption must be the
surviving spouse's allowable deductions. That section reads,
•• Property equal in amount to the clear market value of
one-half of the decedent's separate property shall, if transferred to the spouse of the deceased, be exempt from the tax
imposed by this part. . .. " The words "equal in amount"
clearly show that the relationship between the "Property"
that "shall ... be exempt" and "the clear market value of
one-half of the decedent's separate property" is purely quantitative and that it is immaterial whether the property
exempted is community property or separate property or
whether the separate property or any part thereof does or
does not pass to the surviving spouse. The Controller parses
the pertinent sentence in section 13805 to demonstrate the
validity of this conclusion: The subject of the sentence is
"Property." Stripped of its modifying clauses it reads,
"Property ... shall ... be exempt from the tax imposed by
this part." The first clause, "equal in amount to the clear
market value of one-half of the decedent's separate property,"
modifies "Property" solely as to amount. The words, "equal
in amount," establish a purely quantitative limitation. The
second clause, ., if transferred to the spouse of the deceased, I,
is qualitative and modifies the subject, "Property," and not
the object of the first clause, "decedent's separate property."
Under any interpretation permissible by simple rules of grammar, the exemption extends to any type of property passing
to the spouse, the amount to be limited to the clear market
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property.
[7] Since the second limitation on the marital exemption
is a purely quantitative one and it is immaterial whether or
not the surviving spouse receives separate property, it necessarily follows that it is likewise immaterial what deductions
may be allowed with respect to property the surviving spouse
actually receives. There is no more reason for assuming that
the deductions to be taken in determining the clear market
value of one-half of the decedent's separate property are the
deductions allowable to the surviving spouse than that they
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are the deductions allowable to other distributees.I The underlying premise of the executor's contention, stated in various
ways in his briefs and the briefs of amici curiae, is that the
second limitation on the marital exemption is measured by the
clear market value of one-half of the decedent's separate property passing to the wife. If this premise were valid it would
compel the disallowance of the marital exemption in many
cases where none of the decedent's separate property passes
to the surviving spouse. Thus, if the wife is to receive the
decedent's share of the community property, there would be
no marital exemption even though there was separate property
in the estate passing to other distributees. Such a result
would increase the tax burden of many surviving spouses in
plain disregard of the statutory purpose to grant the marital
exemption regardless of what type of property actually passes
to the surviving spouse.
If, as the executor contends, the phrase "allowable deductions" has meaning only with respect to specific distributees
80 far as the federal estate tax deduction is concerned, it
would have the same meaning so far as other deductions, such
as administration expenses, are concerned. (Compare the
wording of sections 13983, 13986, 13987, and 13988 with that
of section 13989.) Thus, in the present case, since all expenses
were paid from the residue, no deduction therefor would be
allowed to the wife and none would be subtracted from the
market value of half of decedent's separate property. The
executor, however, does not contend that allowable deductions
other than the federal estate tax should not be deducted in
computing the marital exemption; indeed, it includes these
other deductions in its own computation.
•Assume that the deeedent's tuable estate eonsists of eommunity property (decedent's ahare) of a market value of .200,000 and esparate
property of a market value of .100,000; that the allowable deduetionll.
including federal estate tax, total .60,000; that the will provides tbat the
community property goes to deeedent'll wife, and one-balf the separate
property goes to son Jobn an4 the otber half to daughter Mary; and
that the will also provides that two-thirds of the expensell and death
taxes are to be paid from the wife 'II share and one-sixth of sueb expenllell
ill to be paid from eaeb half of the lIeparate property. ThUll $40,000 will
be deductible by the wife and tlO,OOO will be deductible by each of the
ehildren. It is readily apparent that neither the wife'lIlIbare (.200,000 of
eommunity property) nor the allowable deductions with respeet thereto
<.40,000) bear any logiesl relationship to "the elear market value of
one-balf of the decedent's lIeparate property." It would be more reasonable to assume that the "clear market value of one-half of the deecdent's esparate property" was the half going to son Jobn or to
daugbter Mary less his or her allowable deductions.
10 CM-II
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[8] In the third place the executor's contention that the
words "clear market value" have meaning only with respect
to specific distributee!! is withont merit. Section 13312, as
noted previously, states: " 'Clear market value' means the
market value of any property included in any transfer, less
any deductions allowable by this part." Note that this
definition uses the phrase "any property included in any
transfer." Transfer is defined in section 13304: •• 'Transfer' includes the passage of any property, or any interest
therein or income therefrom, in possession or enjoyment,
present or future, in trust or otherwise." The sections that
provide for deductions (§ § 13981-13990) state that the particular expenses "are deductible from the appraised value of
property included in any transfer subject to this part made
by the decedent." It is apparent that none of these sections
support the theory that "clear market value" has meaning
only with respect to specific distributees. [9] Nor do the
sections of the Administrative Code (18 Cal. Admin. Code,
§§ 837, 848, 849), cited by the executor, support such a theory.
They merely provide that the inheritance tax is ordinarily
measured by the clear market value of the distributive share
of a decedent's estate to which a particular transferee is
entitled and provide for such computation. In each sectioll.
the word "ordinarily" is used. Under these sections the clear
market value of the entire estate would be determined and the
tax computed with respect to each distributee's share of the
net estate where the testator directed that all expenses, including federal estate tax, were to be paid from the estate and not
prorated or charged to any of the beneficiaries. In such a
case, no deduction would be allowed to each distributee since
the deductions would be allowed in determining the net estate
(clear market value of the estate). In fact, that result occurred
in the present case, for the federal estate tax was paid from
the residue and, in accordance with the decedent's will, was
not charged or prorated against the individual beneficiaries,
and accordingly, they were not allowed a deduction therefor.
Thus, the clear market value of the property in the residue
was determined and the state tax computed on each beneficiary's share of the net residue. If the executor's theory
that deductions are allowable only with respect to specific
distributees were correct, the Controller improperly allowed
a deduction for federal estate tax against the market value
of property in the residue, for there are 18 beneficiaries of
that residue under the will. No deduction can be allowed to
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each beneficiary, for to do so would require that the expense
be proratably charged to each beneficiary and a deduction

allowed to each contrary to the terms of the will. The statutes
do not require such a result and both reasun and justice dictate
otherwise; [10] Thus, when a testator directs that an expense is not to be charged to the individual beneficiaries but
is to be charged against a part of the estate, the deduction for
that expense should be allowed against that part and the
tax on the beneficiaries of that part should simply be computed on their net share thereof. [11] The Legislature's
use of the phrase "clear market value" in section 13805
plainly demonstrates that that phrase has meaning with
respect to a certain part of the estate for it requires that
the clear market value be taken of one-half of decedent's
separate property, which, as demonstrated previously, need
not pass to a single distributee, i.e. the wife, but may actually pass to various distributees.
The executor contends that its computation is supported
by Estate of Cushing, 113 Ca1.App.2d 319, 332-334 [248 P.2d
482]. That case held that in computing the "one-half of
the community property which belongs and goes to the sur'riving wife, pursuant to Section 201 of the Probate Code"
free of inheritance tax under section 13551 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code, the federal estate tax should not be subtracted with respect to post-1927 community property, i.e.,
community property acquired after the enactment of section
161a of the Civil Code. The court in that case also held,
however, that as to pre-1927 community property, the allowable deduction for federal estate tax should be subtracted
in computing the wife's one-half that is free from inheritance
tax, citing Estate of Atwell, 85 Ca1.App.2d 454,457-458 [193
P.2d 519], which in turn cited and relied upon Estate of
Coffee,19 Ca1.2d 248, 252-253 [120 P.2d 661].
In support of its contention th~· executor urges that part
of the basis for the holding in .Estate of Cushing is that since
there was no federal estate tax on post-1927 community propt'rty, such property did not contribute to the federal tax, and,
therefore, the federal estate tax was not subtracted in determining the wife's share free of inheritance tax. Because of
the federal marital deduction, the executor concludes that the
sam~ is true of the separate property in this case. The contention is without merit, for the federal marital deduction
'1lIAS allowed with respect to the pre-1927 community property
in the Cushing case just as it was allowed with respect to the

)
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separate property in this case. The executor does not deny
that for federal estate tax purposes, pre-1927 community
property is treated in the same manner as separate property
and that a federal marital deduction is allowed with respect
thereto.
The basis of the Cushing decision is stated on page 334
(113 Cal.App.2d) as follows:
"It follows from what has been said that the California
statutes indicate that the widow's one-half of the post-1927
community property, since it is not part of the 'gross estate'
of the husband and is not liable for the federal estate tax,
should not be charged, directly or indirectly, with any portion
of the federal estate tax. This reasoning does not apply to
pre-1927 community property, and, as to it, Estate 0/ Atwell is
controlling. JJ That reasoning does not apply to the decedent's separate property just as it does not apply to pre-1927
community property, for both are treated alike for federal
estate tax purposes and both are part of the decedent's" gross
estate." Consequently, Estate 0/ Cushing supports the Controller's and not the executor's contentions.
The executor contends that section 13805 is modeled after
the federal marital deduction and that to subtract federal
taxes in computing the state marital exemption is to reach a
result contrary to that reached under the federal statute. (26
U.S.C.A., § 2056.) The state statute provides for the subtraction of allowable deductions by the use of the words" clear
market value" just as the federal statute provides for their
subtraction by the use of the words "adjusted gross estate,"
i.e., the gross estate less deductions allowed by sections 2053
and 2054. (26 U.S.C.A., § 2056.) The difference is that the
federal statute does not allow any deduction for federal
estate tax or for state inheritance tax,' whereas the state does
allow a deduction for federal estate tax. If the federal statutes (26 U.S.C.A., §§ 2053-2054) provided for a deduction of
either federal estate tax or state inheritance tax, such deductions would be made in determining the C Cadjusted gross
estate" and would therefore enter into the computation of
the federal marital deduction. [12] Since the state statute
does provide for the deduction of the federal estate tax in
determining II clear market value," it must therefore enter
into the computation of the state marital exemption, for that
exemption is governed by the controlling words CI clear market
'A limited credit is allowed, however, for etate inheritance tax under
26 U.S.O.A., t 2011.

/)
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value" whose meaning is made to depend on allowable deductions. [13] Moreover, the state provisions were not intended
to have the same consequences as the federal provisions, for
the state provides for a marital exemption rather than a
deduction. (Compare also the terminable interest rule in 26
U.S.C.A., § 2056 with Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13805.) The difference is that the federal deduction comes oft the top of the
tax brackets (26 U.S.C.A., §§ 2001, 2051), whereas the state
marital exemption comes oft the bottom, i.e., the tax is computed on the remainder of the property at the same rates that
would have been applicable had the exemption not heen
allowed. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13403; ct. § 13989 as amended
in 1957.)
[14] The executor contends that the Legislature intended
substantial equality in the tax treatment of separate property
and post-1927 community property and that such equality
requires the exclusion of the federal estate tax from the
allowable deductions in computing the marital exemption. The
extent of such equality, however, must be determined by the
statute. It is clear that full equality was not intended, for as
mentioned above, section 13805 provides for an exemption
rather than an exclusion and section 13312 compels the consideration of federal estate tax as an allowable deduction.
[15] The executor contends that the Controller's interpretation of secp-on 13805 conflicts with the policy expressed in
the proration provisions. (Prob. Code, §§ 970-977.) The
proration provisions provide, when applicable, that the federal
estate tax shall be equitably prorated against those beneficiaries whose shares contributed· to the creation of such tax.
Section 13805, however, is concerned with the computation of
the. marital exemption for state inheritance tax and is Dot
concerned with which shares shall be charged with the payment of the federal estate tax. Thus, when the proration
provisions apply, only those ~neficiaries whose shares contributed to the creation of the federal estate tax will be
charged with the payment thereof. The proration provisions
do Dot establish a policy that there shall be no state inheritance tax on any property qualifying for the federal marital
deduction. This conclusion is obvious Dot only from the
nature of those provisions but from the fact that the proration
provisions were enacted (1943) five years before the federal
marital deduction provision was enacted (1948) and seven
years before the state marital exemption provision was enacted (1950).
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Finally, amici curiae contend that the Controller's interpretation of section 13805 is absurd because the identity of other
legatees may affect the amount of the marital exemption.
Examples are set forth in their brief to demonstrate this
alleged absurdity by showing that when there are bequests to
charities, the federal estate tax will be lower and the second
limitation on the marital exemption will be higher. There
is nothing absurd about this result, for it necessarily follows
from the deduction allowed for the federal estate tax that the
higher that tax is, the lower will be the net taxable estate
subject to the state inheritance tax. Thus, if the estate·
consisted of separate property valued at $15,000,000 and the
only charge against it is a federal estate tax of $6,000,000, the
net taxable estate subject to the state inheritance tax would be
only $9,000,000, because a deduction is allowed for the federal
estate tax just as deductions are allowed for administration
expenses. Thus anything that reduces or augments the federal estate tax, whether it be the allowance or disallowance of
exemptions, exclusions, charitable or other deductions, will
reduce or augment the clear market value of the decedent's
separate property. Moreover, the same result occurs with
respect to pre-1927 community property under Estate of Atwell and Estate of Cushing, and would occur as well under the
executor's theory when the wife's share is charged with the
payment of all ()r a percentage of the federal estate tax.
The orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The statute which, by its express terms, should govern this case is section 13805 of the
Revenue and Taxation Code. That section declares that
"Property equal in amount to the clear market l1alue of onehalf of the decedent's ,eparate properly ,hall, if transferred
to the spouse of the deceased, be eumpt from the tax imposed
by this part . . . " (Italics added.) I find nothing unclear in
the language chosen by the Legislature.
The computations of the executor are obedient to the statute. But the Controller, with the approval of a majority of
this court, in effect amends the statute by changing the base
of the exemption from the "clear market value of one-half of
the decedent's separate property" to one-half of the value
of such portion of the decedent's separate property as may
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remain after the federal estate tax shall katie been deducted
from the value of the estate.
This act, if regarded as legislative, obviously is in derogation of section 1 of article III of the California Constitution.
If justification is sought on the theory that it is "judicial
construction" it is equally indefensible, for the construction
brings a result contrary to the interest of the taxpayer in
violation of the oft reiterated principle that tax· statutes are
to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against
the state. (County of Los Angeles v. Jones (1939), 13 Cal.
2d 554, 561 [2] (90 P.2d 802], and authorities there cited;
Whitmore v. Brown (1929),207 Cal. 473, 483 (279 P. 447].)
The suggestion of the majority that the executor's theory
could work adversely to the taxpayer in a totally different
situation is not persuasive; it ignores the specificity of the
situation which is before the court and assumes that in the
different situation as well as in this one the court will construe the applicable statutes in favor of the state and against
the taxpayer. I would follow the contrary rule and give
to the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt in any case wherein
the legislative language was uncertain enough to admit of
construction.
It follows that the order from which the executor appeals
should be reversed.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 17,
1958. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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